







he supply of electrical energy is a segment of the
economy that has traditionally been subject to
numerous interventions by the state. The basis for
this is the opinion that supplying electricity is a vital
public service that should not be exposed to the risks
of the market. Therefore, electricity was provided
solely by state-run monopolies or strictly regulated
private regional monopolies throughout the world
until the late 1980s.
To the extent the concept of competition as the pre-
dominant governing principle gained acceptance in
the 1980s with deregulation policies in the United
States and, above all, Great Britain, governments
also examined the extent to which supplying energy
could be subjected to the laws of the market in order
to reach energy and environmental policy goals
more efficiently through competition: Market-ori-
ented competition was to supply
consumers at the most favour-
able terms. It is undisputed that
electrical grids can be viewed as
a natural monopoly, since elec-
tricity is an energy source that
must be transmitted over lines.
The construction of parallel
lines for the purpose of competi-
tion between networks is gener-
ally unreasonable from an eco-
nomic standpoint. Conversely,
however, the other levels of the
value chain – generation, trad-
ing, sales – must be opened up to competition. To
ensure competition in these segments and prevent
grid operators from abusing their monopoly posi-
tions,regulation of prices and services provided over
the electrical grid is necessary (Figure 1).
Internal market as prelude
These realizations are increasingly being accepted in
European policy, too.As an essential component on
the path to a unified European internal market –
which was contemplated in the treaties founding the
European Union – the EU Commission tackled
reform of the regulatory framework of the European
electricity and gas industry in the nineties, using the
energy market reforms in Great Britain, Norway,
and later in the other Scandinavian nations as a
model. Even though the common goal was “more
competition in the energy markets”, the reform had
to take into account the differing initial situations in
the individual EU countries. Thus, in France and
Italy about 90 percent of electricity consumption by
end users was attributable to a single company in
each country, whereas in Germany, for example, a
pluralistic structure predominated with regional
monopolies covered by anti-trust laws. Other mar-
kets were already organized around a competitive
model: England and Wales introduced a wholesale
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market with a pool-system in 1989 and broke up the
heretofore vertically integrated energy utilities into
various energy generation and sales companies
(which were then privatized) and a grid operator
(which was later taken public). Norway followed in
1991. There, too, the state power supply companies
were broken up into a grid company (Statnett) and a
generation company (Statkraft). Later a power ex-
change was set up in Oslo (NordPool 1993). In the
years that followed, Finland (1995) and Sweden
(1996) took similar steps to reform their electricity
markets, which were expanded by the entry of these
countries into the Norwegian power exchange sys-
tem. The development of all these markets was ori-
ented toward the same model: the abolition of re-
gional or national monopolies by opening up gener-
ation markets to competition, free access to the grid
for third parties, a free choice of supplier by con-
sumers and the establishment of wholesale markets
for electricity.
In view of the structural differences,it was not possi-
ble to harmonize the systems of liberalized markets
with those of countries still closed to competition
within a reasonable period of time. This meant that
only general, omnibus legislation – which enabled
individual countries to pursue different methods of
implementation and market organization while
maintaining the common goal – made sense with
respect to liberalization and deregulation at the
European level.
After four years of tough negotiations,the European
Council and the European Parliament adopted the
first Directive on the Internal Market in Electricity
in 1996, based on Art. 95 of the EC Treaty. It took
effect on 19 February 1997 and was to be transposed
into national law within two years.The main require-
ment was to take steps to open national electricity
markets to competition. In the first step in 1999,
23 percent of the market was to be opened up; by
2000,this limit was to be expanded to 28 percent and
by 2003 to at least 33 percent.These threshold values
represented minimum values, which could also be
exceeded by the individual member states under the
principle of subsidiarity by selecting the customers
eligible for competition. In addition, the Directive
governed the organization of grid access, the separa-
tion of the grid from sales and generation in terms of
management and accounting,and free access to gen-
eration and line construction.Thus, the markets that
had already been liberalized acted as models for
development of the Directive. However, diverging
from this, the Directive permitted three systems for
organizing grid access: regulated access, negotiated
access and the single buyer system.1
The first phase of German electricity market
reform
The energy law in effect before the implementation
of the Internal Market Directive in Germany dated
from the year 1935 and placed the private sector
electricity industry under state supervision. Major
components of this law included a requirement that
electricity suppliers obtain permits before commenc-
ing operations, an obligation to supply electricity to
all customers and the establishment of closed supply
areas.These regional monopolies, which were based
on an exception in the Act against Restrictions on
Competition, were negotiated in license agreements
with municipalities in exchange for the payment of
license fees for the use of public roads. In addition,
the tariffs for supplying small customers were sub-
ject to state regulation. Special agreements were
made with large buyers and policed by the Federal
Cartel Office for abuse.
The EU Directive on the Internal Market in Electric-
ity required a fundamental revision of existing energy
law. The Energy Industry Act [Energiewirtschafts-
gesetz], which took effect on 29 April 1998, required
energy supply companies to grant other companies
access to their networks in a non-discriminatory man-
ner (Figure 2).There was no requirement to unbundle
the current vertical integration of companies into gen-
eration,transmission/distribution and sales companies.
These segments merely had to be shown separately in
accounting records. At the same time, all customers
received the right to choose their suppliers freely at
the first step.This complete and immediate liberaliza-
tion distinguished Germany from the majority of
European countries,which decided to open their mar-
kets gradually. Germany took another separate path
by deciding not to set up a regulatory authority. The
government relied on the market to regulate itself and
restricted itself to ex post controls by reviewing allega-
tions of abuse under anti-trust laws.
Associations of grid operators and grid users were to
regulate grid access jointly and determine grid fees
1 Under the single buyer system, the single buyer is responsible for
centralized purchase and sale of electricity.If a customer in this sys-
tem finds a supplier with a low price,the single buyer takes this elec-
tricity into its grid, and the customer receives the price advantage.through association agreements based on the princi-
ple of negotiated grid access. In the first association
agreement, the associations initially agreed upon
transaction-based fees, which were to be charged
separately for each transit. Since this concept be-
came a real barrier to competition due to procedur-
al complexities, a non-transaction and non-distance-
related fee was introduced when the association
agreement was amended in 1999. Negotiated grid
access was significantly simplified by setting uniform
grid fees per grid operator and voltage level.In addi-
tion, industry solutions were developed, e.g. for data
management and for switching customers. However,
they were only recommendations, and not all com-
panies adopted them.
Even if network access was troublesome at the start
of liberalization, industry and households neverthe-
less profited from significant decreases in prices
attributable to the competition
that sprung up between 1998
and 2000. The industry became
more consolidated due to the
cost pressure resulting from
falling prices (Figure 3).The ini-
tial eight large inter-regional
utilities merged into the four
companies that exist today:
EnBW AG, e.on Energie AG,
RWE AG, and Vattenfall Eu-
rope AG. These companies ac-
count for about 80 percent of
the electricity generated in Ger-
many.Their subsidiaries operate
the transmission network in the
four German control zones. In
addition, they hold equity in-
terests in numerous of the over
50 regional utilities and approxi-
mately 840 local suppliers, which
are mainly municipal utilities.
In the first phase of the liberal-
ization, a large number of new,
independent suppliers caused
significant movement in the
market. However, most of their
business models turned out to be
not economically viable over the
long term. In addition, they felt
noticeably constricted by estab-
lished utilities. The charging of
changeover fees or insistence on
highly complex sets of contracts
were cited as examples of this. Today only a small
number of suppliers remains in the mass market.
New players in the services and trading segments
and alliances of regional or local utilities (e.g.
Trianel) have been more successful in establishing
themselves in the market.
An essential component of this success was the start
of exchange trading in Germany in 2000:in two mar-
ketplaces initially (Leipzig and Frankfurt) and then
only at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in
Leipzig after their merger in 2002.The EEX initially
started with pure spot market trading,but now offers
monthly,quarterly,and yearly futures on the forward
market, too. 138 companies from 17 countries cur-
rently trade on the EEX (March 2006). In 2005
alone, the total trading volume rose by 52 percent to
602 terawatt hours (TWh). The quantity traded on
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the spot market alone (86 TWh) corresponds to
17 percent of all electricity consumption in Germa-
ny.Thus,the EEX is currently the most liquid whole-
sale trading market in Europe, excluding mandatory
exchanges, such as the Spanish OMEL.
The increase in government charges, a strong in-
crease in the demand for electricity,and rising prices
for primary sources of energy have resulted in a
noticeable increase in end consumer prices in Ger-
many since 2000. Even though these prices were still
below the pre-liberalization level in 2005, the prices
were seen to be a sign of inadequate competition in
the electricity market as early as 2003.
To the extent electricity became a commodity listed
on an exchange, the cost-plus principle, which had
predominated in the wholesale market in the past,
was replaced by a market price formed on the basis
of supply and demand.The amount of this competi-
tive price for electricity is currently based on the
marginal costs of the most expensive power plant
still necessary to meet demand. If the costs of the
marginal power plant increase,the market price also
increases. Significant factors influencing the supply-
side are, for example, the availability of power
plants and the (increasing) feed-in from wind power
generators in the short term and changes in capaci-
ty or the composition of the power plants – which
have more long-term effects.Weather, business con-
ditions, and demographic changes may affect the
demand side.The market price may also be affected
by political factors, such as subsidies for renewable
energies and combined heat and power generation
and the introduction of trading in CO2 emission cer-
tificates since 2005.
The highest possible availability
of reliable information and,there-
with, high market transparency
are of great importance to the
functioning of the wholesale mar-
ket for electricity, which is influ-
enced by so many factors. Market
participants have responded to
calls for regulation of the infor-
mation that should be published
with voluntary initiatives, e.g.,
with respect to available transmis-
sion capacity or generation. For
example, since early April, the
four large German power plant
operators have provided informa-
tion on installed and available
capacity and generated energy to all interested parties
on the EEX Internet platform each trading day.This is
to increase confidence in pricing on the EEX and fur-
ther promote competition.
The second phase – start of regulation
Along with the reluctance of member states to open
their markets rapidly and complaints all over Europe
about difficulties in gaining market access,this devel-
opment gave the Commission reason to provide a
stimulus for accelerating the liberalization process by
presenting proposals for a new directive.
In 2003, the European Council and the European
Parliament agreed on an acceleration package
(Figure 2). The new regulation obliged member
states to open the electricity market for all commer-
cial customers by 2004.From 2007,all household cus-
tomers in the EU were to be able to freely choose
their suppliers. In addition, vertically integrated
companies were required to unbundle and create a
separate legal entity for the grid (with the possible
exception of companies with < 100,000 customers).
Finally, member states were required to set up na-
tional regulatory authorities.
These changes necessitated extensive amendments
to the German Energy Industry Act. This change in
paradigm from association agreements to a regulat-
ed system contributed to Germany’s inability – and
that of many other member states – to meet the
1 July 2004 deadline for implementing the Directive
into national law.The new Energy Industry Act final-
ly took effect on 13 July 2005, more than a year late.
Source: RWE.
 New Act on the regulation of the German electricity and gas markets (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz – EnWG) 
enforced on 13 July 2005
 New regulatory authority "Bundesnetzagentur"   (BNA, Federal Grid Agency, formerly known as regulatory agency
for post and telecommunications) to monitor grid access as well as electricity and gas grid fees 
 Grid operators with fewer than 100,000 electricity or gas customers can be regulated by one of the 16 federal 
states. The federal states may delegate responsibility to the BNA.
 Ex-ante approval of all grid fees
 Method of calculating grid fees 
– Present "current cost accounting" to be maintained for existing assets; real rate of interest on equity 
(equity-financed regulated asset base) 6.5%
– As of 2006, regulation based on historic cost accounting with inflation-adjusted returns for new assets; 
nominal interest rate on equity 7.91 %
 Proposal of a system of incentive regulation until July 2006 by BNA to replace the current "cost plus" calculation. 
Incentive regulation, on the basis of a legal regulation, is expected to become effective in 2008.
 The tariff-rate approval by the federal states for electricity tariffs of residential customers will be abolished two 
years after the formal start of regulation.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NEW GERMAN ENERGY INDUSTRY ACT (EnWG)
Figure 4Grid access rules remained basically unchanged with
the exception of the rules for the balancing power
market. The most important new rules for the elec-
tricity sector (Figure 4) were as follows.
A regulatory agency was set up to supervise grid
access and monitor grid fees (Figure 5). Regulatory
tasks were delegated to the Federal Grid Agency for
Electricity, Gas, Mail, Telecommunications, and
Railroads (the Federal Grid Agency for short,
BNetzA). State regulatory agencies are responsible
for companies with fewer than 100,000 customers
connected to their distribution grids if their distribu-
tion grids are situated within that German state.The
German states can re-delegate these tasks to the
Federal Grid Agency. All the German city-states as
well as the States of Thuringia, Lower Saxony,
Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
have made use of this option.
In the future,all grid fees must be
approved ex ante by the compe-
tent regulatory agency. The rules
for calculating such fees are set
forth in detail in the Energy
Industry Act and in a supplemen-
tal Network Fee Regulation. For
new assets, the return on equity
was set at 7.91 percent. For old
assets it is 6.5 percent (before
taxes in each case). The equity
ratio was limited to 40 percent.
Beyond mere cost control, an
incentive regulation system is to
be established no later than
2007. The Federal Grid Agency
is to work out a concept for this
system by July 2006 with the par-
ticipation of the German states
and the affected industrial asso-
ciations and scientists. The sys-
tem will be finally established by
a regulation issued by the Ger-
man Federal Government with
the approval of the Bundesrat.
Vertically integrated companies
will be required to unbundle
their networks legally,functional-
ly and in accounting terms, from
the generation, sales and trading
segments (Figure 6).While trans-
mission network operators must
unbundle as soon as the new Energy Industry Act
takes effect, the legal unbundling of distribution grid
operators can be postponed until 1 July 2007. Dis-
tribution grid operators with fewer than 100,000 cus-
tomers, which are not part of a corporate group, are
excepted from the requirement of legal unbundling.
Sales companies must inform their customers of
the composition of the electricity they deliver and
its environmental effects. In so doing, distinctions
must be made between the categories of nuclear
energy,fossil fuels and other fuels.In addition,the
grid fee must be shown separately on customer in-
voices.
Finally, it was decided that – consistent with regula-
tion of the grid segment – ex ante review of general
tariffs for small customers should expire when the
Federal Tariff Regulation for Electricity expires in
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WHO'S BUSINESS: FEDERAL OR STATE LEVEL?
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July 2007.Thus, there would be a transition from the
cost-plus principle to competitive prices for this
group of customers, too. Due to increasing freedom
in setting prices, new market participants, in particu-
lar, would be given incentives to enter the market in
form of margins that are likely to be adequate. For
this reason,it was anticipated that competition would
be stimulated in the household customer market.
Therefore, the Federal Grid Agency concentrates on
the grid segment.The agency is responsible for rule-
making, e.g. for the incentive regulation and the bal-
ancing power market, and for grid access and cus-
tomer switching procedures. Its oversight responsi-
bility extends, for example, to compliance with un-
bundling requirements and non-discrimination pro-
visions, in addition to approval of grid fees.The Fed-
eral Grid Agency is also the place for grid users to
file complaints.
The Federal Grid Agency has no influence on price
formation in the wholesale and retail markets. It is
the task of the Federal Cartel Office to monitor this
as part of its policing of abuse under anti-trust laws
(Figure 7). In the special case of trading at power
exchanges,stock exchange oversight authorities,such
as the Stock Exchange Council [Börsenrat] or the
Trade Monitoring Office [Handelsüberwachungs-
stelle] are responsible for preventing market manip-
ulation.Allegations that the “Big Four” abused their
market power were again not proven in the sector
inquiry by the EU Commission. The commission
found no evidence of this in light of their actual mar-
ket shares of the wholesale trade and the large num-
ber of marginal power plants involved in price-set-
ting. This is all the more so, since the influence of
wind-generated electricity and interconnection ca-
pacity on the competitive situation was not taken
into account.
The Federal Grid Agency has already dealt with a
massive quota of work since its inception in the sum-
mer of 2005. In addition to harmonizing customer
switching procedures and data formats, and ques-
tions about balancing group accounting and obtain-
ing minute reserves, comprehensive data on grid
operators has been gathered.Thus, power grid oper-
ators had to provide the Federal Grid Agency with
almost 700 individual pieces of data on their compa-
nies by 1 November 2005 as a basis for the compari-
son market and the incentive regulation. For many
companies compliance was difficult since these data
could often not be gathered or could not be gathered
as within the stated stipulations.
However, the Federal Grid Agency has focused its
efforts on reviewing applications for approval of grid
fees. Electricity grid operators had to submit their
applications to the competent regulatory authorities
by the end of October 2005.The review period is six
months from the time all documents are submitted.
In addition, there were conceptual activities in de-
veloping the incentive regulation.
Current and future challenges: Design of incentive
regulation
It appears that politicians and the public will mea-
sure the success of the regulatory authorities solely
by how quickly grid fees drop. Lower grid fees
should make it easier for competitors to enter the
market and facilitate liberaliza-
tion. However, the aim is to find
a reasonable balance between
an adequate return on invested
capital, so grid operators can
maintain their ability to invest,
and the interest of grid users in
the lowest possible prices.
One problem with traditional
cost-plus regulation, which is
currently the basis for grid fee
approval proceedings, is a ten-
dency for regulated companies
to over-invest. This occurs when
the grid operator’s costs of capi-
tal are lower than the return it is
granted.Added to this are possi-
Source: RWE.
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Figure 7ble inefficiencies in operations:
When regulation is cost-based,
the grid operator has no incen-
tive to lower its costs, since they
are reimbursed on a 1:1 basis.
Any reduction in costs would di-
rectly result in a reduction in re-
venues.
Thus, the focus of the current
review of approval applications
is on whether the grid costs list-
ed by grid operators are really
grid costs and if their scope is
justified. Despite extensive data
collection by the Federal Grid
Agency, the problem remains
that,in doubtful cases,grid oper-
ators always have better knowledge of their cost sit-
uations than the regulatory authorities. Therefore,
grid operators will try to use this superior knowledge
to their advantage in the cost reviews.Therefore, the
Federal Grid Agency tends to mistrust all attempts
by grid operators to maintain the current level of
costs. It is anticipated that the Federal Grid Agency
may use the extensive discretion granted to it by the
Grid Fee Regulations to lower fees markedly. In
light of the interpretation of the calculation method
announced by the Federal Grid Agency, litigation is
beginning to emerge over the correct interpretation
of the regulations. Thus, instead of imputed trade
taxes, only the portion of actually paid trade taxes,
attributable to network operation, should be recog-
nized. This would annul the combination of public
services in many municipal utilities for tax purposes
and run counter to the concept of unbundling. In
addition, the Federal Grid Agency is attempting to
limit the equity needed for operations and thereby
the returns on invested capital to such an extent that
the grid operator’s ability to make investments may
be significantly restricted.
These problems should be overcome – at least in
part – with introduction of the Incentive Regulation
in 2008. However, the basic goal of this mechanism
is to influence the behaviour of grid operators so
they develop a self-interest in making grid operation
more efficient within the framework of maximizing
their operating profits. Thus, both customers and
grid operators should profit from the advantages of
increased efficiency. Additionally, grid operators
should be enforced to invest in the grid not being
negatively affected by the incentive regulation.
Thus, the Federal Grid Agency must act with high
sensitivity not trying to push through marked grid
reductions at any costs.
In its first draft for the report, to be compiled by July
2006, the Federal Grid Agency already presents
detailed proposals (Figure 8).Here,too,there is a cost
control at the start of the first two regulatory periods
– which will last between three and five years.To this
end, a development path for revenues is to be estab-
lished for each regulatory period, based on the initial
cost basis. This determines the extent to which the
grid operator must change its revenues within the reg-
ulatory period. Apart from inflation, the basis for
determining efficiency requirements is firstly, the
anticipated development of general productivity of
grid operators and secondly, efficiency objectives that
are specific to the company.The latter are determined
by benchmarking the grid operator using a combina-
tion of various methods to ensure robustness.Deficits
in efficiency that would not be found by cost control
are to be detected through “as if” competition, taking
structural differences thoroughly into account. In so
doing, it must be kept in mind that the grid operator
with the lowest fees is not necessarily the most effi-
cient. More inefficient grid operators will be given
higher objectives than efficient ones.
Increases in efficiency and cost reductions below the
established level are credited to grid operators in the
form of additional profits that may be retained.
These additional increases in efficiency are not
passed on to grid users until the start of the next reg-
ulatory period, as part of cost controls.
If the grid operator does not meet efficiency require-
ments through lack of effort or if the regulatory au-
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INCENTIVE REGULATION: DRAFTED CONCEPT OF THE FEDERAL GRID AGENCY
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thority sets the requirements too high, there is a risk
the grid operator may suffer a loss.Therefore, one of
the core requests of the energy industry associations
(VDEW,VDN) is that the efficiency requirements be
not only attainable but also surpassable.A grid oper-
ator of average efficiency must be able to obtain aver-
age, market-based profits. If the Federal Grid Agency
proposes to introduce efficiency requirements that
are based on the most efficient grid operator, this will
overstrain most of the grid operators reducing their
profits far in excess of the objectives of grid regula-
tion. On the contrary ensuring the achievability of
efficiency requirements has to be one of the basic
principles of incentive regulation.
There are differences of opinion, particularly with
respect to what amount of progress in increasing
productivity and efficiency is possible and reason-
able for an individual grid operator within a regula-
tory period.The regulatory authority must not quan-
tify potential reductions of individual cost items, but
must rather determine the overall potential for in-
creased productivity on the basis of only those costs
that are subject to influence.Completely eliminating
all the inefficiencies identified in the benchmarking
process within one period could overtax a company,
as shown by experience, e.g. Great Britain. In the
final analysis, the grid operators themselves are
responsible for selecting the measures to be taken.
However,additional standards on the quality of sup-
ply (interruptions of supply, quality of service, quali-
ty of the voltage) should prevent cost-cutting mea-
sures from being taken solely at the expense of the
quality of supply.Whereas reductions in grid fees are
apparent immediately, omitted investments become
apparent gradually in the medium and long term
only.Therefore, there is no clear accountability.
With respect to the demands for noticeably lower
grid fees often raised by politicians and the public, it
must be recognized that many costs cannot be influ-
enced by the grid operator – at least in the short
term. This applies, for example, to the costs of grids
with higher voltage levels that can only be passed on,
to system services and to additional costs occasioned
by the Renewable Energies Act or the Combined
Heat and Power Generation Act. Moreover, grids
cannot be modified at will within a short period of
time. They have developed over time and can be
adapted to changes in generation and consumption
structures only within the framework of long-term
investment cycles. The efficiency potential of opti-
mizing fixed assets that can only be optimized over
the long term must be much larger than optimizing
the particular fixed assets. Since investments cause
short-term costs of capital and generate revenues
only in the long run, incentive regulation at first
hampers investments. Moreover, personnel costs
cannot be reduced at will, due to collective wage
agreements and employment laws. All these consid-
erations must be taken into account in setting effi-
ciency requirements. Therefore, there can be no
rapid downward price spiral to the level of the most
economical grid operators if these differing consid-
erations are taken into account.
The Federal Grid Agency will present its final pro-
posal for an incentive regulation in July. Politicians
and regulatory authorities will then face the task of
moulding it into a regulation. On the one hand, the
incentive concept must be simple and transparent
for the public. On the other hand, complex opera-
tional and economic interrelations must be reason-
ably reflected. All participants must resist attempts
to simply push through grid fee reductions – which
are unreasonable from an operational standpoint –
for purely political reasons. Otherwise, restrictions
on the grid operator’s ability to make investments
can endanger the currently recognized high quality
of supply.
At present,it is unclear how the division of responsi-
bilities between the Federal Grid Agency and the
state regulatory authorities will work out.A commit-
tee involving representatives from the Federal Grid
Agency as well as from the States should ensure
close coordination and a uniform interpretation of
discretionary leeway. It is still too early to assess the
extent to which this will succeed.
Questions of grid access have lesser weight as com-
pared to other industries. The electrical grid is, of
course, a natural monopoly, and rules must be estab-
lished for its use. However, it is not in exclusive use,
as are railroads and gas networks. Of particular im-
portance are the rules associated with first-time use
of third-party grids, e.g. in the context of a customer
switching or connection of a power plant to a grid.
For example, a sales company must not gain access
to grid data through common use of IT systems.Grid
users must be treated equally in billing procedures.
A transparent and non-discriminatory procedure
must be implemented for processing grid connection
applications from power plants, particularly if avail-
able grid capacity is not adequate for the connection
capacity being requested in a territory.Prices in the wholesale markets have led many inves-
tors to initiate new power plant projects and expand
generation capacity.The large number of investment
projects being announced attests to this. This also
proves that, if there is competition in the wholesale
markets, the markets will provide sufficient incen-
tives for investment in security of supply.The mem-
ber states of the European Union rightly refrained
from including command measures in the accelera-
tion package and in the discussions of the Directive
on the Security of Electricity Supply and Infrastruc-
ture Investments.
Applications to connect power plants to the grid,
which are currently piling up particularly in North
Rhine-Westphalia, provide new challenges to trans-
mission grid operators.Not only must they integrate
these power plants into the grid,they must also cope
with the expansion of wind energy and increasing
demands made on the efficiency of the transmission
grids by the growing international trade in electrici-
ty.The increasing feed-in of wind energy – which is
concentrated in North Germany far from the main
consumer centres – into the grid and the trade in
electricity therefore require, according to the con-
clusions of the 2005 Dena Study on the Integration
of Wind Energy, the construction of at least 855 km
of new high voltage lines, particularly in a north-
south direction, by 2015. This is aggravated by the
planned shutdown of nuclear power plants, primari-
ly in southern Germany,where no adequate replace-
ment investments are foreseeable. This not only
stresses the ability of transmission operators to in-
vest. In view of the long planning and approval pro-
cess, however, these changed requirements appear
difficult to meet.
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